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TheDistribution of Control
over Income and Resources
Inthe past decade, there has been a general resurgence of interest in the impact to
of policies in developing nations on the distribution of control over income and
resources. In Chile, too, there has been a rising interest in distributional ques- te
tions, although in that country such issues have not been far from center stage
for some time.' 0!
The primary focus in those discussions has been on the distribution of ef
income by classes or by factors. A number of other dimensions of the distribu-
tion of control over income and resources, however, also have been important: re
private versus public shares in output, domestic versus international shares, the
distribution among sectors, regional concerns, and the interests of the present tr
generation versus those of future generations. te
In this chapter the impact of the international economic regime on some re
of those dimensions will be explored.2 The focus is on three questions: (i) 1,
What have been the distributional objectives? (ii) What have been the effects
1)1
of foreign-sector policy on distribution? (iii) Were there alternative means of
achieving the same objectives at lower cost? Q
In most of these dimensions generalizations about the objectives are very
difficult. Various governments at various times and different groups in society th
at particular times have not agreed on distributional priorities. More often than re
not recent governments have tended to state as their preferences decentraliza-
tion and redistribution in favor of lower-income classes and labor, the public
sector, manufacturing, and future generations. Only in the domestic-foreign ci
dimension, however, has there been widespread agreement. In that case the
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consensus has been growing for some time that a reduction of foreign control
is desirable.
The distributional consequences of the international economic regimes
have been manifold and sometimes contradictory. For example, consider the
impact on the labor share. Overvaluation has led to higher real wages and
higher employment in the short run. Even in the short run, however, more
intensive quantitative restrictions have led to lower real wages, especially be-
cause of the considerable protection given to some important mass-consumption
subsectors. In the longer run, moreover, the international economic policies
have created inducements for substitution of capital for labor. In some sectors
the negative effects on the demand for labor have been considerable. Protective
barriers, furthermore, have precluded competition from the world market and,
thus, competitive pressures for greater efficiency and productivity.
Consideration of the labor share also provides illustrations of some trade-
offs which are pervasive in considerations of distributional questions. One
quandary is provided by the difference between short-run and long-run results.
Keeping food prices low, for example, increases real labor income in the short
but discourages agricultural production in the long run. More generally,
devaluation and liberalization might create more jobs in the long run, but tend
pact to cause immediate unemployment.
and Trade-offs among the distributional objectives also are important. Pro-
ties- tection has resulted in redistribution toward industry, for example, as has been
tage widely desired. The high protection for some of the traditional consumption-
oriented subsectors, however, has lessened real wages of labor because of the
of effects on prices of consumer goods used by wage earners.
bu- Finally, the distributional consequences of the international economic
—Ult: regime are often very hard to reverse because of the establishment of strong
vested interests. In the Chilean case the prime example is provided by the
eat traditional consumer-goods subsectors. These industries have received pro-
tection at least since the 1897 tariff law. To lower the implicit subsidies they
receive because of the foreign-sector regime would be very difficult, however,
(i) becauseof the strong political forces which have grown up as a result of that
tCts protection.
of Neoclassical analysis can almost always devise more efficient ways than
QRs to redistribute control over income and over resources. Sometimes the
ery neoclassical prescriptions suffer, however, from unrealistic assumptions about
the ease of tax-transfer mechanisms. Nevertheless, the greater use of price-
related mechanisms would make it possible to pursue distributional objectives
•
r4 withfewer distortions in inducements. The use of explicit subsidies instead of
implicit ones, furthermore, would make the nature of the resources transfer
clearer and thus subject to more conscious examination through the political
we process.
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11.1 DISTRIBUTION BY INCOME CLASS
Recent Chilean governments, especially those under presidents Frei and
Allende, have had as one proclaimed important objective the reduction of dis-
parities in the distribution of income. This objective has shaped the inter-
national economic regime in a number of respects. For example, Chilean
governments often have been reluctant to devalue the currency in part because
of perceived regressive income-distributional effects of that action.3
Chilean society, however, has not been monolithic in its objectives. A
number of competing groups have attempted to maintain or extend their shares
of income. In reference to foreign-sector policy, the narrow interests of some
of these groups have prevailed over the more diffuse interests of the general
public and of consumers. The existence of these and other strong pressure
groups has limited the success of redistributional measures even under the
most progressive governments.4 Under governments with a lower priority for
redistribution or none, the influence of these special-interest groups has
dominated.
The nature of past international economic regimes, moreover, has sig-
nificantly strengthened the relative position of some of these groups. To be
more explicit, the maintenance of high industrial protection by means of re-
strictive regimes has encouraged the development of strong vested interests
among the factor owners in the more protected industries, the importers who
receive the import premiums, and the bureaucrats who run the system.
Redistributional efforts have involved many policies other than those in
the foreign sector. Minimum wages, price ceilings, human-capital investments,
agrarian reform, and changing control and ownership in industrial and service
sectors all have been utilized. However, foreign-sector policies also have had
considerable effects.5 The available evidence is somewhat fragmentary, but
does permit some analysis of these effects on one of the special-interest groups6
and on the factoral division of income.
11.1.1Import Premiums and Distribution.
An important special-interest group comprises the importers themselves.
The mean import premium rate for 1946—70 was 0.77 (column 4 in Table
5.1). Although at times import licenses have been allocated directly to pro-
ducers, generally traders have been the recipients. Therefore, traders also have
received substantial income increments due to the restrictive regimes.
The relative magnitude of the import premiums has varied inversely with
the degree of liberalization and the degree of overvaluation. As is noted in
subsection 5.1.1, the correlation coefficient between the import premium rateTHE DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROL OVER INCOME AND RESOURCES 257
and the PLD-EER was —0.46 for the quarter-century after the Second World
War. Movements in the imported component relative to other components in
price indices also are suggestive in this regard. In 1956, for example, the im-
ported component decreased relatively substantially despite a devaluation of
about 25 per cent which accompanied the initiation of the Alessandri effort at
stabilization plus liberalization. The Instituto de Econonila [1963:25] claims
• that this fall primarily reflected the reduction of oligopolistic returns to the
• previously more limited number of importers.
Even without devaluation, of course, the government could mop up the
A import premiums going to traders without affecting production substantially by
•res utilizing exchange auctions or increasing import taxes. This probably would be
desirable given apparent Chilean objectives.7 An alternative possibility, which
• the Allende government explored, was to replace private traders by govern-
ment trading companies. Such a tactic clearly decreased the import premiums
going to private traders. It also expanded substantially another interest group,
for namely, the government bureaucracy. Available data do not permit rigorous
• analysis of the efficiency of this alternative operation.
fig- 11.1.2Real Wages and the International Economic Regime
be
More information is available about the impact of the international ceo-
nomic regimes on the factoral shares of real income. The mean shares of labor
Pho in GDP for phases and subphases since 1940 do not have a strong phase
association (line 4.2 in Table A. 1)Thelargest decline was recorded in the
Phase IV period of 1957—6 1, but the only other fall was for Phase II of 1952—
55.' Otherwise, an upward secular trend dominated. The same secular trend
•
— ice also predominated in the average real wage—again with little indication of
—lad phase-associated fluctuations- (line 4.1 in Table A. 1).
Despite the foregoing suggestions of very limited phase associations, other
6 datareveal that the foreign-sector regime has had substantial impact on real
wages and employment." Four types of empirical approach are used here to
explore the relation of real wages to the international economic regime."
i. Cross-sectional data is used to determine whether there are significant
associations between the variance in protection across subsectors and wages.
es. Tables A.5 and A.6 contain all the significantly nonzero correlation coefficients
among levels and rates of change of ITRs and EPRs and levels and rates of
change of wages and wage shares. Significantly negative correlations are found
ye between both ITRs and EPRs and both wages and wage shares. The changes
in wages and wage shares between 1957 and 1967 are significantly positively
correlated with ITRs and with the change both in ITRs and in EPRS between
• 1961 and 1967. The nominal and effective structures of protection created by
te the international economic regimes, thus, were associated with low but rela-
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lively rapidly increasing wages. These increases, moreover, were associated in
positively with the changes in protection.
Cross-sectional evidence also sheds some light on the impact of foreign- U
sector regimes on consumption-goods prices wage earners have had to face. th
As is mentioned several times above, the government has often tried to lessen
price increases for certain mass-consumption items by instituting favorable
import provisions. The ITRs in Table 5.3suggestthat it succeeded in keeping
the relative price increases due to trade barriers fairly small for the most im-
portant single mass-consumption category, food products.'2 At least in 1961,
however, such barriers were quite high for some other important mass- ei
consumption sectors, especially footwear and clothing, textiles, and beverages.
Unless the level of aggregation is obscuring the impact, therefore, it must be
concluded that this attempt by the government was not completely successful.
ii. Time series for subsectoral PLD-EER(PI)s in Table A.8 provide fur-
ther information about the success of the government in using the foreign-
sector regime to keep mass-consumption items relatively cheap. Food products
did have a low mean PLD-EER(PI) in comparison to other mass-consumption th
items such as beverages, textiles, and footwear. However, the mean for food te
products was above that for at least eight other manufacturing subsectors, to re
say nothing of agriculture and mining. Moreover, discriminatory policies favor-
ing cheap food imports presumably would have caused the PLD-EER(PI) for I'.
food products to become relatively low in more restrictive periods, but it did q
not. Subject again to the caveat about aggregation, this evidence reinforces the 5
doubts raised in the previous paragraph about the success of the government n
in its attempt to keep mass-consumption items cheap through discriminatory
trade policies. d
iii. Partial-equilibrium time-series regression analyses of the determinants b
of the rates of change of sectoral wages are presented in Behrman [1971 and
1974]. The only significant direct impact of the international economic regime c
isthrough the price-expectational effect of changes in NERs. Estimates in
Behrman [1974] of the determinants of the rate of change of the consumer
deflator indicate a much stronger reaction to foreign-sector changes, including
variations in NERs. The net direct result of devaluation, thus, would be a de-
dine in real wages. ft
iv. The general-equilibrium model of Chapter 2 provides further insight st
about the impact of changes in foreign-sector policies on real wages. For the
reasons suggested in the previous paragraph, the impact elasticity of real wages
with respect to the NER is negative, amounting to —0.4 (line 4.1.1 for simu- tx
lation 2.1.1 in Table A. 11). Thus, this result supports the reluctance to devalue
because of the perceived negative effects on real wages and on total labor in- ti
come.'3 Because wages also adjust more slowly than product prices to changes eiTHE DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROL OVER INCOME AND RESOURCES259
d in quantitative restrictions, however, the elasticity of real wages with respect to
such restrictions also is inverse and rather sizable: —1.1 (simulation
Liberalization at the same time as devaluation, therefore, would tend to offset
e. thenegative consequences for real wages of the latter.15
11.1.3Employment and the International Economic Regime.
• Theabove approaches also provide insight into the impact of the inter-
1, national economic regime on the other component of real labor income-
s- employment:
•s. i.Cross-sectional data are used to determine whether there are significant 4,
associationsbetween the variance in protection across subsectors and factor-
• to-factor or factor-to-output ratios (Tables A.5 and A.6). Protection was
positively correlated with the capital-labor ratio (EPR3) and growth in horse-
power capacity between 1957 and 1967 (ITR2). The same associations hold
for changes in protection between 1957 and 1967. These results suggest that
the structure of protection may have encouraged the use of capital-intensive
•'. technology despite the abundance of labor. If so, the international economic
to regimes may have added significantly to unemployment problems.
ii. Time series for PLD-EER(PI)s provide supporting information. The
mean PLD-EER(PL) ratio of investment goods to consumer goods for the
id quarter-century following the Second World War was 0.64 (column 4 in Table
5.2). Foreign-sector policy thus encouraged the use of capital-intensive tech-
nologies by keeping the price of foreign capital goods relatively low. Mamalakis
ry [1971 :565—5 87] reports, moreover, that CORFO loan proced'ures further re-
duced the cost of capital.16 Loans to enterprises made in domestic currency
—Is but backed by hard currency were repaid in domestic currency at less than their
original value because of negative real interest rates.17 The effect of such
CORFO policies on employment is illustrated by the decrease in the relative
in share of the labor force after 1945 in the most rapidly growing industrial sub-
er sector, basic metals, because of the capital-intensive nature of the CORFO-
financed CAP operations.
e- iii. The partial-equilibrium time-series analysis in Behrman [1972a]
further corroborates this conclusion. The estimated sectoral elasticities of sub-
bt stitution between capital and labor generally are significantly nonzero. The
te technical possibility of substituting subsidized capital for labor therefore existed.
These estimates of the elasticity of substitution make it possible to illus-
trate the employment impact of some specific foreign-sector policies. Labor
• demand in large-scale mining, for example, was more affected by the interna-
U- tional economic regime than demand in any other sector. Large-scale mining
• enterprises could purchase imported capital equipment directly with the foreign-
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exchange proceeds earned by their exports. They paid much of their domestic
labor, however, in domestic currency which had to- be purchased at an often
quite disadvantageous NER (see section 3.2 and column 1in Table 3.2).18
The employment impact of this discriminatory exchange-rate policy can
be seen under the following assumptions: the production function for large-
scale mining is a CEStypewith an elasticity of substitution of 0.51 as esti-
mated for all of mining in Behrman [1972a], output and prices are given, and
tendencies for labor demands to adjust to marginal productivities prevail in the
long run. Relation 11.1 then gives the ratio of labor that would have been S
employed in large-scale mining in long-run equilibrium (L') at different labor
prices (PL') to those actually employed in long-run equilibrium (L) at actual
prices (PL). I
L'/L =(PL/PL')°-'1 (11.1)
Reynolds [1965:284] gives an implicit estimate for PL/PL' of 2.03. This I
value, together with the above assumptions, implies that the long-run demand
I
for labor in large-scale mining would have been 44 per cent larger had exchange-
rate discrimination not affected the dollar cost of labor. If PL/PL' is assumed
to have been the ratio of the bank spot NER to the special NER in 1954 (al-
though the former clearly was undervalued) and other assumptions are main-
tained as before, the long-run equilibrium labor demand in large-scale mining
would have been 590 per cent larger! With the option of increasing output, the
demand for labor would have been even greater.'9 Such calculations should not
be taken literally, but they do suggest that the employment effects of the dis-
criminatory NER policy may have been quite considerable.
I iv. The general-equilibrium impact of the international economic regime
on the economywide demand for labor in the short and medium run is given
in Table A.!! under the assumption that such demand is highly correlated with
the capacity-utilization rate. As is discussed in section 9.2 above, devaluation
and liberalization both have immediate negative impacts on the utilization rate
e variable (line 2.1 for simulations 2.1.1 and 2.3.1).
r This result poses a trade-off between the longer-run employment gains
discussed above and the short-run loss. Policies to moderate this trade-off by
d facilitating labor mobility, by increasing aggregate demand, and by gradually
reducing protection in the weaker subsectors may be necessary for a successful
liberalization program. On the other hand, moderate policies may not work
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C
11.2 PRIVATE VERSUS GOVERNMENT
CONTROL OVER OUTPUT
The objective of the government with regard to the division between private
and government control over output has fluctuated over the years. Some govern-
d ments—for example, Alessandri's in 1958—64——have favored a larger role for
the private sector because of a belief in the greater efficiency of the private
sector and because of a desire to protect or to promote certain private interest
groups. Other governments—for example, Allende's in 1970—73—have seen a
need to expand substantially the government's role in order to make necessary
reforms and to restructure society despite the opposition of strong vested in-
terests. Even though the governments themselves have maintained a range of
positions on this spectrum, moreover, a large portion of the government bu-
reaucracy always has found the expansion of government activity to be in its
own self-interest.
The desirability of relative expansion of government control over re-
sources thus has been a matter of dispute among various groups in Chilean
society and among different administrations. Most of the assertions that are
made pro and con are very difficult to test. To attempt to do so, moreover,
would be beyond the scope of the present study. However, some indication of
the relationship between the type of international regime and the relative role
of the government can be made.
More restrictive regimes have shifted resources to the government in at
least two important ways: 20First,government imports have been given high
priority at substantially overvalued EERs (subsection 4.1.7). In 1971, for
•—
example,the government share of imports increased to 45 per cent mainly be-
cause government imports were exempted from the 10,000 per cent prior
import deposit requirement introduced in May of that year. Second, the gov-
ernment netted substantial revenues from its operation of the multiple exchange-
rate system because of the large differential (especially before the Nuevo Trato
of 1955) between the escudo price it paid to large-scale mining enterprises for
dollars and the price at which it sold such dollars (compare columns 1 and 13
in Table 3.2).
rk On the other hand, greater restrictiveness has also worked in the opposite
direction: First, it reduced the quantity of foreign trade, a relatively convenient
• source of tax revenue (see sections 6.2 and 7.2). Partly as a result of this de-
dine, tax revenues related to foreign trade as a proportion of total taxes have
dropped secularly from a mean of 0.83 in 1908_2721 to a mean of 0.18 in
1965—70 (line 1.2.6.6 in Table A. 1)Second,at times it lowered the effec-
live average import tax rates since restrictions usually were applied more
stringently to commodities with higher legal tax rates.m The intensity of re-262 IMPACT OF FOREIGN-SECTOR REGIMES
strictions also has had some relation to the availability of loans to the govern-
ment from foreign sources (see Chapter 8).
Partially as a result of these counterbalancing effects, the share of the
government in GNP, savings, and investment does not indicate any strong
phase association (see lines 3.1.2.3 and 3.3.1—3.3.4 in Table A.1).24 Within
the framework of the general-equilibrium model of Chapter 2, however, the
net consequences can be identified: 25devaluationleads to an immediate drop
in government revenues as the reduced taxes from imports offset increased
revenues from large-scale mining (lines 4.4.1, 4.4.1.1, and 4.4.1.2, for simula-
tion 2. 1.1 in Table A. 11). Reductions in quantitative restrictions, however,
have the opposite effect (simulation 2.3.1). Tax revenues increase because of
large increments from imports and large-scale mining. Government consump-
tion also increases. Devaluation apparently has a negative effect on government
revenues' because of inflationary pressures, but an appropriate degree of lib-
eralization could offset this effect.
11.3 DOMESTIC VERSUS FOREIGN SHARES
Before the Great Depression, net outflows to the foreign owners of Chile's
nitrates were quite substantial (see section 1.2). Since then, the division between
domestic and foreign income has been determined primarily by the govern-
ment's treatment of large-scale copper mining.
Policies toward large-scale copper mining are discussed in some detail in
sections 4.2.1 and 7.2. Their dominant feature has been a strong secular trend
toward increased Chilean control, which culminated in the nationalizations of
1971. Superimposed on this trend were some fluctuations associated with the
extent of liberalization. The more restrictive regimes usually tended to increase
the Chilean share relative to the foreign share of returns from mining. How-
ever, at times, they did so at the expense of the absolute magnitude of the
Chilean share (subsection 7.1.2.3).
One important component of the division between domestic and foreign
factor shares is the size of net factor payments from abroad. The effect of de-
valuation and liberalization on this flow can be examined within the framework
of the general-equilibrium model of Chapter 2. The first-year elasticity of net
factor income from abroad with respect to all NERs is —1.8 and that with
respect to quantitative restrictions is —4.0 (line 4.2.1 for simulations 2.1.1 and
2.3.1 in Table A.!!)Devaluation,then, would increase foreign income be-
cause there would be higher exports from large-scale mining and reduced unit
dollar costs for domestic factors utilized in mining. This increase in foreign
income, however, does not imply a reduction in Chilean control of foreign
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reserves both rise (lines 1.3.1 and 1.3.3). Although maintenance of overvalued
NERs would reduce factor payments to foreigners, therefore, it would be at
e theexpense of Chilean control of foreign resources.
Liberalization, too, would increase factor payments abroad because of
the expansion of exports (Table A.l 1, line 1.1)Butimports would increase
even more than exports; so in this case Chilean control of foreign exchange
would fall (Table A.l 1, lines 1.2, 1.3.1, and 1.3.2). If sufficient devaluation
accompanied the liberalization, of course, this negative feature could be offset.
Another important factor in the division between domestic and foreign
r shares is the size of capital movements. Increased quantitative restrictions dis-
•)f courage net inflows, but they also restrict outflows. The net effect is not a priori
obvious (for detailed discussion of these movements, see section 8.2). Positive
• associations of these movements with the degree of liberalization do seem to
have prevailed for direct investment and private short-term capital movements.
For other components, however, there is no evidence of such a correlation.
11.4 SECTORAL AND REGIONAL
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND
RESOURCES
Mamalakis [1965,1971b] has characterized the distributional conflict in Chile
as having been essentially one of "sectoral clashes." He portrays a process in
in which the manufacturing sector gained the upper hand in terms of policy for-
mation in the l930s at the expense of agriculture and mining.
Whether or not one agrees with Mamalakis's emphasis on the importance
of conflicts between sectors, there is no doubt but that foreign-sector policy
has had significant implications for sectoral shares. The effect of the more re-
strictive regimes has been to shift income and resources toward government,
manufacturing, and services (see Chapter 10). In manufacturing, at least until
very recently, foreign-sector policy has favored the same traditional subsectors
for which in many cases explicit protection dates back to the 1897 tariff.
A pertinent question I wish to raise at this point is the extent to which pat-
terns of protection reflect the degree of political power. One index of relative
et political power of the various subsectors is the degree of industrial concentra-
th tion. The greater the concentration, the greater is at least the potential for or-
Id ganized political pressure from a subsector. Tables A.5 and A.6 contain all
significantly nonzero correlation coefficients between the degree of concentra-
lit tion in 1957 (the only year for which the data are readily available) and levels
and rates of change of ITRs and EPRs.
ITRs for 1967 and the change in ITRs between 1961 and 1967 are posi-
tively correlated with the degree of concentration. Under the above assumption264 IMPACT OF FOREIGN-SECTOR REGIMES
and subject to the usual ceteris paribus qualifications, thus, these correlations
support the hypothesis that levels and changes in product protection reflected
the degree of political clout. Because of such political power, moreover, reduc-
ing protection in certain subsectors is very difficult. Some long-protected infants
may never grow up, but they may maintain enough political power to induce
the general public to continue to transfer resources to them behind trade bar-
riers. Such a characterization fits a number of Chilean manufacturing sub-
sectors all too well.
In the Chilean case, questions of regional distribution are tied quite closely
to sectoral ones. Increased quantitative restrictions generally have caused w
shifts from the north (mining) and south (agriculture) to the center (manu- Ic
factunng, commerce, and government). Most government revenues have been
spent in the center, most imports are made to the center, and most expenses of
operating the regime have been incurred in the center. The attempts to offset 7
these movements, such as the operation of special regimes for the extreme ends at
of the country (subsection 4.1.5.1), have only partially balanced the flows to P]




1.Chileans may have been more sensitive to distributional questions than citizens
of many other countries because of the high inflation rates (line 2.1 in Table A.1). With ai
product and factor prices changing so much there has been much more potential for
relative-price changes than in most countries. Under such conditions the income distribu- a
tion might change substantially quite quickly. Therefore, it has been privately useful
for numerous interest groups to devote considerable resources to defending their share
of income. The private returns from such activities have been quite high in comparison
to the returns from increasing real productivity.
2. Since some of these subjects are discussed fully in other parts of this book, they ti
are covered here in only a limited way (e.g., sectoral distributions, which are explored
in Chapter 10) or not at all(e.g., the generational trade-off, which is taken up in
Chapter 12).
3. The sliding-peg NER policy of 1965—70 was one exception to this situation. Even
in that period, however, the PLD-NER and PLD-EER declined (see column 13 in Table
3.2 and column tin Table 5.1). cli
4. The existence of trade-offs between the accomplishment of redistributional ifl
objectives and other objectives of the government also has limited success in the attain- W
ment of redistributional goals. th
5. The government has seemed to be conscious of some of the redistributional
implications of foreign-sector policies, but not of others. An example of the latter is the to
decision tc, use only fiscal bonds for prior import deposits in 1962—64 (see subsection
4.1.4). The intent of this shift was to limit imports. One regressive result, however, was cl
to create very high scarcity rents for the relatively wealthy bond owners. Ct
6. A second important special-interest group, the highly protected sectors or sub- m
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sectors,is briefly considered in section 11.4, below. The bureaucracy to run and cope
iS with the exchange-control system is yet another interest group. Some aspects of the
impact of the degree of restrictiveness on government expenditures—in part to support
this bureaucracy—are taken up in Section 11.2.
ts 7. It clearly would not be desirable from the point of view of the traders. It also
might not be desirable from a social point of view. If growth were the overwhelmingly
dominant objective, if a shortage of domestic savings were a critical bottleneck restrain-
ing growth, if traders had a higher marginal propensity to save than the government,
b andif traders did not illegally transfer too much of these savings abroad, for example,
this transfer of the import premiums might not be socially desirable.
8. If the information were readily available the division of labor into blue- and
white-collar groups would be useful and might reveal differential results since social
legislation earlier favored the latter group. For the 1940—50 period for which the data
exist, however, Marshall [1957:190—192] reports that changes in income distribution
between these two groups were not statistically significant.
9. Contrary to the claims of Ffrench-Davis [197 1:20]. Instituto de EconomIa [1963:
71], and Sierra [1969:51], the mean real wage and mean wage share for the 1956—58
attempt at stabilization plus liberalization were at least as high as in the previous sub-
phase. This point is important because these and other commentators have made such
claims part of their criticism of the Ibañez-Klein-Saks effort.
10. Only developments since the Great Depression, and primarily since the Second
World War, are considered in this section. Information for the years before the Great
Depression is very scanty. However, the expansion of mining production for export did
provide a climate conducive to the development of the first strong Chilean labor move-
ments and did provide new loci of political power which supported the election of Arturo
Alessandri in 1920 and the subsequent passage of extensive white-collar labor legislation
in 1924. For details see Mamalakis [1971:92—118], Mufloz [1968:197], Pinto [1962: 100],
and Reynolds [1965:228—229].
11. One important point is not discussed below because it is hard to quantify with
available data. Restrictive systems tended to discriminate against labor because the large
private gains which could be attained by obtaining special exemptions from the regime
generally were not captured by the laboring class. Luxury imports through the special
regional regimes, especially in Arica, were one example.
Another possibly important point which cannot be quantified is that labor produc-
tey tivities and therefore wages may have been lower because of protection from competitive
pressures for efficiency from the international market.
12. Agricultural production, however, may have been discouraged by this policy;
so there may have been a long-run direct cost in terms of domestic food production
(section 9.2).
ble 13. Hachette [1966] concludes that overvaluationaffectsthedifferent income
quartiles about identically, but benefits the lower-income groups slightly more. If labor
income is concentrated in the lower-income groups, the present results are consistent
in- with the direction of relative benefit indicated by Hachette, although the magnitude of
the benefits indicated by the present results probably is greater.
pial Some commentators have pointed to the increasing proportion of indirect taxes in
total taxes during liberalization attempts and have concluded that such a shift also was
regressive. For example, Ffrench-Davis [1971:361 and Sierra [1969:89] make such a
claim because of the increase in indirect taxes from 44.4 to 49.1 per cent of the total
during 1959—61. However, most of this increase occurred in import taxes in such a
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14. To the extent that movements in the consumer deflator overstate movements in
the prices paid by laborers because of the differential impact of quantitative restrictions
on imports which favor wage goods, the elasticities in Table All overstate the impact
on real wages and on the labor share in income. However, it seems unlikely that such
a consideration would alter substantially the results reported there.
15. Note that liberalization would raise average real wages, bfit increase the dis-
parity between low agricultural wages and much higher mining and manufacturing wages
(lines 4.1.1.1—4.1.1.3 for simulation 2.3.1 in Table All).
16. In a neoclassical world with an elasticity of substitution less than I, a reduction
in the cost of capital services would increase the labor share in output. This result is not
certain in the real world of Chile, however, because of adjustment problems, unemployed
factors, and nonprice determinants of capacity utilization.
17. The central government provided the necessary subsidies to CORFO.
18. Some of the more skilled Chilean workers and technicians were paid in dollars
before 1971. This procedure meant that inducements existed for substituting more skilled
for less skilled labor, as well as capital for labor.
The termination of this practice by the Allende government lowered those recipients'
real incomes substantially because they previously had converted part of their dollars into
escudos at the favorable black-market NER. Part of the problem in realizing the pro-
grammed expansion of large-scale copper mining in the early 1970s, in fact, is reputed
to have originated in the exodus of Chilean and foreign technicians because of this
change (see subsections 4.2.1 and 7.1.2.3).
19. With changes of this size, however, the adjustment of copper prices and the
price of labor probably would have somewhat offsetting effects on the demand for labor.
20. The Chileanization and nationalization of copper, the major export, also led to
a large movement of resources to the government. This action, however, was part of a
long secular trend and was not particularly phase related (see subsection 4.2.1).
21. It is emphasized in section 1.2 that government revenue depended on the foreign
sector before the Great Depression. Total government revenues increased at an annual
exponential rate of 0.044 between 1844 and 1928 due to expansion of foreign trade and
despite the reduction of revenues from other sources.
22. Not all of this drop was due to the discouragement of exports by Chilean
policy. Part of it reflected a conscious effort to develop domestic sources. Part of it also
reflected a decline in exports for reasons beyond Chile's control.
23. The very restrictive 1952—55 subphase is one example. At other times, however,
this pattern did not always hold (line 1.2.6.9 in Table Al).
24. Likewise, the only two significant deviations from the secular growth rate for
government GDP and for real government direct and financial investment in 1940—65
do not indicate a clear pattern. They both are for Phase II periods, but are opposite in
sign (Table A.2).
25. Within this model, however, the extent of government access to foreign financ-
ing is held constant.
26. Four points about these simulations should be kept in mind: (i) The pre-1967
share of foreign ownership in large-scale copper mining is assumed. (ii) The estimates
in Behrman [1974] indicate no direct (or partial-equilibrium)effect of quantitative
restrictions on net factor payments from abroad. All the impact is indirect, primarily
through variables relating to large-scale mining activity and profits. (iii) The elasticities
are so large because the variable of interest is the difference between two flows (see note
a to Table All). (iv) Capital movements are held fixed exogenously.
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Book value with disputed 1913 claim
Book value without disputed 1913 claim
.115 .120 .101 .104
.337 .193 .156 .150
El Teniente .284 .366 .283 .153
The lack of a phase association is not surprising given the importance of world copper
prices in determining profit rates. For the simulation discussed in the text, world copper
prices are held constant.
•er,
65
in